Several remarks on the book by Professor Andrzej Kisielewicz, Logic and Argumentation. Practical Course in Critical ThinkingProfessor Andrzej Kisielewicz’s book concerns active forms and methods of teaching logic, also outside the context of university education. It possesses prac­tical value and may also be an auxiliary material for, among others, high school students. Despite some shortcomings, such as unjustified ascription of the status of hypothesis to statements, a flawed definition of the methodological and epistemological concept of a historical fact, it contains (...) many valuable and original logical propositions pertaining to critical and logical thinking.Undoubtedly, the book will be useful in education and helpful in introducing teachers and learners to using grammatical and logical rules. It will allow the reader to detect post-truth in the media or the shuffling of premises in argumentation. After implementing indispensable corrections and additions, it should become an obligatory reading — not only in the context of university education. (shrink)

Generally speaking, philosophical reflection can assume two extreme forms: it can either be based on metaphysical reflection which gives it the traits of a universalistic philosophy, or empiricism, in which case it can be called philosophical minimalism. There are no others alternatives, and the above categories apply to all philosophical systems. Smolikowski’s philosophy is maximalistic and metaphysical, hence he was right to call the system universalism philosophy. As W. Tyburski writes, Smolikowski’s universalism philosophy has two main goals: to provide firmer (...) ground for metaphysics and stand in opposition to both positivism and German pessimism philosophy. (shrink)

Mismatch negativity is the electroencephalographic waveform obtained by subtracting event-related potential responses evoked by unexpected deviant stimuli from responses evoked by expected standard stimuli. While the MMN is thought to reflect an unexpected change in an ongoing, predictable stimulus, it is unknown whether MMN responses evoked by changes in different stimulus features have different magnitudes, latencies, and topographies. The present study aimed to investigate whether MMN responses differ depending on whether sudden stimulus change occur in pitch, duration, location or vowel (...) identity, respectively. To calculate ERPs to standard and deviant stimuli, EEG signals were recorded in normal-hearing participants who listened to roving oddball sequences of artificial syllables. In the roving paradigm, any given stimulus is repeated several times to form a standard, and then suddenly replaced with a deviant stimulus which differs from the standard. Here, deviants differed from preceding standards along one of four features. The feature levels were individually chosen to match behavioral discrimination performance. We identified neural activity evoked by unexpected violations along all four acoustic dimensions. Evoked responses to deviant stimuli increased in amplitude relative to the responses to standard stimuli. A univariate analysis yielded no significant differences between MMN responses following violations of different features. However, in a multivariate analysis, acoustic features could be decoded from the topography of mismatch responses, although at later latencies than those typical for MMN. These results support the notion that deviant feature detection may be subserved by a different process than general mismatch detection. (shrink)

Traditional theism (in Christianity, Judaism and Islam) understands God as possessing certain attributes including omnipotence. God is omnipotent in the sense that God possesses unlimited (maximal) power. For some classical philosophers and theologians (PetrusDamiani, René Descartes) God’s omnipotence requires his being able to do absolutely anything, including the logically impossible. But in Thomas Aquinas’ opinion, to do what is logically impossible is not an act of power but is self-contradictory action. For Aquinas, a logically impossible action is not an action. (...) The contemporary British philosopher of religion, Richard Swinburne, considers omnipotence from an analytic perspective and, partially,within Aquinas’ tradition. For Swinburne, omnipotence includes the power to perform only logically possible and consistent tasks. In this paper, I discuss systematically (§§ 3-6) the philosophical and logical problems of omnipotence and the relation between God and logic from the perspective of Jan Łukasiewicz’s logical investigations. Keywords: Omnipotence, God, logic, rationality, Richard Swinburne, Jan Łukasiewicz. (shrink)

For decades Ryszard Wójcicki has been a highly influential scholar in the community of logicians and philosophers. Our aim is to outline and comment on some essential issues on logic, methodology of science and semantics as seen from the perspective of distinguished contributions of Wójcicki to these areas of philosophical investigations.

This posthumous publication attempts to answer the question of what moral code is the most reasonable. Philosophers often turn to consequentialism or deontological ethics to address this issue. As the author points out, each has valid arguments but each is unable to get the other side to agree. To rectify this, he proposes a third way. Inside, readers will discover a theory that tries to do justice to both sides. The author first details consequentialism and deontological ethics. He also explains (...) their fundamental conflict. One holds the view that you should do what has the best consequences. The other believes that there are actions which are wrong to do even if they have the best consequences. Next, the volume considers various ways to solve this conflict. Would rejecting one theory work? Or, is it possible to somehow reconcile them. The author shows why these solutions fail. He then goes on to present his own. The resulting contractual theory brings together the two opposing ethical convictions. It proposes that what is right and wrong depends on what norms people would agree to. Throughout, coverage explores the psychological, sociological, and historical background of the moral theories discussed. The reason is that moral theories are embedded in social and psychological contexts. They are better understood when the contexts are explicit. This key feature distinguishes the volume from other works in moral philosophy. At the time of his death in July 2011, Jan Österberg was close to completing this manuscript. It was taken up and fully completed by Erik Carlson and Ryszard Sliwinski, both of Uppsala University. (shrink)

The general aim of this book is to provide an elementary exposition of some basic concepts in terms of which both classical and non-dassicallogirs may be studied and appraised. Although quantificational logic is dealt with briefly in the last chapter, the discussion is chiefly concemed with propo gjtional cakuli. Still, the subject, as it stands today, cannot br covered in one book of reasonable length. Rather than to try to include in the volume as much as possible, I have put (...) emphasis on some selected topics. Even these could not be roverrd completely, but for each topic I have attempted to present a detailed and precise t’Xposition of several basic results including some which are non-trivial. The roots of some of the central ideas in the volume go back to J. Luka siewicz’s seminar on mathematicallogi. (shrink)

Cooperation between doctors of various specialties and other medical specialists is the standard of care in the treatment of patients. Due to the variety of diseases and the dynamic development of medicine in general, it is difficult to be an expert in every field and know all the recommended treatments. An example of such cooperation is the joint treatment of patients with the problem of ingrown toenails. The article contains an analysis of patients who received treatment in a doctor’s office (...) in cooperation with podiatrists. A conservative approach towards the treatment of this condition sees the patient being initially diagnosed and treated by a podiatrist and then later, if necessary, being referred to a doctor for surgical treatment. The exchange of experiences and information on patients treated by interdisciplinary teams allows doctors and podiatrists to find the best possible treatment and improve the quality of life of patients. The follow-up of patients after surgery can be performed later in podiatry offices. Owing to modern electronic communication, it is possible for a doctor to constantly monitor the patient’s condition without the need for direct visits to the doctor’s office. (shrink)

This article explains how people synchronize their thoughts through empathetic relationships and points out the elementary neuronal mechanisms orchestrating this process. The many dimensions of empathy are discussed, as is the manner by which empathy affects health and disorders. A case study of teaching children empathy, with positive results, is presented. Mirror neurons, the recently discovered mechanism underlying empathy, are characterized, followed by a theory of brain-to-brain coupling. This neuro-tuning, seen as a kind of synchronization between brains and between individuals, (...) takes various forms, including frequency aspects of language use and the understanding that develops regardless of the difference in spoken tongues. Going beyond individual-to-individual empathy and SYNC, the article explores the phenomenon of synchronization in groups and points out how synchronization increases group cooperation and performance. (shrink)

Stephenson (2022) has argued that Kant’s thesis that all transcendental truths are transcendentally a priori knowable leads to omniscience of all transcendental truths. His arguments depend on luminosity principles and closure principles for transcendental knowability. We will argue that one pair of a luminosity and a closure principle should not be used, because the closure principle is too strong, while the other pair of a luminosity and a closure principle should not be used, because the luminosity principle is too strong. (...) Stephenson’s argument also depends on a factivity principle for transcendental knowability, which we will argue to be false. (shrink)

This paper aims to present the main contours of Burns’s literary output which, interestingly enough, grows into a personal understanding of the collective mindset of -Troubles Northern Ireland. It is legitimate, I argue, to construe her fiction as a body of work shedding light on certain underlying mechanisms of sectarian violence. Notwithstanding the lapse of time between 1998 and 2020, the Troubles’ toxic legacy has indeed woven an unbroken thread in the social fabric of the region. My reading of the (...) novelist’s selected works intends to show how the local public have been fed by an unjustified—maybe even false—sense of security. Burns, in that regard, has positioned herself amongst the aggregate of writers who feel anxious rather than placated, hence their persistence in returning to the roots of Northern Irish societal divisions. Burns’s writing, in the above context, though immersed in the world of the Troubles, paradoxically communicates “an idiosyncratic spatiotemporality”, namely an experience beyond the self-imposing, historical time limits. As such, it gains the ability to provide insightful commentaries on conflict-prone relations, the patterns of which can be repeatedly observed in Northern Ireland’s socio-political milieu. Overall, the main idea here is to discuss and present the narrative realm proposed by Burns as determinate, liminal in terms of time and space, positioning readers between “then” and “now” of the region. (shrink)

1. Die erste Hälfte des Kommentars, mit Ausnahme der Kapitel über die Weltseele.

'What is real?' has been one of the key questions of philosophy since its beginning in antiquity. But it is not just a question that philosophers ask. This Very Short Introduction discusses what reality is by looking at a variety of arguments, theories, and thought-experiments from philosophy, physics, and cognitive science.

The title of this paper is a theorem, which I am going to state and prove. The theorem extends from prepositional to predicate languages the result I presented in [5].

This paper was written with two aims in mind. A large part of it is just an exposition of Tarski’s theory of truth. Philosophers do not agree on how Tarski’s theory is related to their investigations. Some of them doubt whether that theory has any relevance to philosophical issues and in particular whether it can be applied in dealing with the problems of philosophy (theory) of science. In this paper I argue that Tarski’s chief concern was the following question. Suppose (...) a language L belongs to the class of languages for which, in full accordance with some formal conditions set in advance, we are able to define the class of all the semantic interpretations the language may acquire. Every interpretation of L can be viewed as a certain structure to which the expressions of the language may refer. Suppose that a specific interpretation of the language L was singled out as the intended one. Suppose, moreover, that the intended interpretation can be characterized in a metalanguage L +. If the above assumptions are satisfied, can the notion of truth for L be defined in the metalanguage L + and, if it can, how can this be done? Many students of Tarski’s conception will find the above exposition inconsistent with their own views on the essence of Tarski’s conception. On the other hand, as it is argued in this paper, the proposed interpretation of Tarski’s ideas allows one to use Tarski’s theory as a fundamental tool for semantic analyses of various theories, factual theories in particular. More specifically, it is argued that Tarski’s theory of truth allows one to clearly oppose a theory meant to be certain deductive system (a set of accepted sentences, say axioms, and a logical machinery for deducing from them new ones) and a theory meant to be a certain semantic system, i.e a set of sentences that serve to communicate some states of affairs and to use that opposition to explicate and occasionally also define the notion of truth. The opposition in question is of the utmost significance for analyzing some developments in both mathematics and factual sciences. The approach which is concerned with the logical relations between the elements of science such an approach is throughout this paper called analytical is put into question. The growth of science is determined by how well scientific theories are able to account for factual states of affairs. The intuitive notion of truth applied by the scientists does not necessarily correspond in a straightforward way to its Tarskian counterpart. On the other hand, as is claimed in this paper, the Tarskian notion of truth offers as adequate explication of intuitive notion of truth as possible. (shrink)

This paper was written with two aims in mind. A large part of it is just an exposition of Tarski’s theory of truth. Philosophers do not agree on how Tarski’s theory is related to their investigations. Some of them doubt whether that theory has any relevance to philosophical issues and in particular whether it can be applied in dealing with the problems of philosophy (theory) of science. In this paper I argue that Tarski’s chief concern was the following question. Suppose (...) a language L belongs to the class of languages for which, in full accordance with some formal conditions set in advance, we are able to define the class of all the semantic interpretations the language may acquire. Every interpretation of L can be viewed as a certain structure to which the expressions of the language may refer. Suppose that a specific interpretation of the language L was singled out as the intended one. Suppose, moreover, that the intended interpretation can be characterized in a metalanguage L +. If the above assumptions are satisfied, can the notion of truth for L be defined in the metalanguage L + and, if it can, how can this be done? Many students of Tarski’s conception will find the above exposition inconsistent with their own views on the essence of Tarski’s conception. On the other hand, as it is argued in this paper, the proposed interpretation of Tarski’s ideas allows one to use Tarski’s theory as a fundamental tool for semantic analyses of various theories, factual theories in particular. More specifically, it is argued that Tarski’s theory of truth allows one to clearly oppose a theory meant to be certain deductive system (a set of accepted sentences, say axioms, and a logical machinery for deducing from them new ones) and a theory meant to be a certain semantic system, i.e a set of sentences that serve to communicate some states of affairs and to use that opposition to explicate and occasionally also define the notion of truth. The opposition in question is of the utmost significance for analyzing some developments in both mathematics and factual sciences. The approach which is concerned with the logical relations between the elements of science such an approach is throughout this paper called analytical is put into question. The growth of science is determined by how well scientific theories are able to account for factual states of affairs. The intuitive notion of truth applied by the scientists does not necessarily correspond in a straightforward way to its Tarskian counterpart. On the other hand, as is claimed in this paper, the Tarskian notion of truth offers as adequate explication of intuitive notion of truth as possible. (shrink)